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and only in the former case did the court expressly cite section 242 of the
Restatement.89
In the case at bar, the Illinois Supreme Court clearly followed the over-
whelming majority of American jurisdictions by relieving the master of
liability to a third person injured while a passenger on the master's vehicle
at the unauthorized invitation of a servant. However, by adopting the
Restatement rule and its rationale, the court went one step further by
denying recovery on the theory that plaintiff had forfeited her claim
against the master by accepting the invitation of the servant. The effect of
this decision cannot be underestimated, for clearly it has rendered obso-
lete in Illinois those key factors previously accepted by our courts in de-
termining the master's liability. No longer will inquiry be made as to
whether there is evidence of wilful and wanton misconduct, or whether
the accident occurred within the course of employment. The break with
the past is clear. It remains now to be seen whether other jurisdictions will
follow the example of Illinois and Kansas, the only two jurisdictions which
expressly recognize the section as controlling authority.
Robert Williams
30 In this regard, it will be noted that the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Klatt v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 11. 2d 481, 211 N.E.2d 720 (1965), cited only Union
Gas & Electric Co. v. Crouch, supra note 30, Mayhew v. De Coursey, supra note 31, and
the Reporter's Notes to the Restatement.
BANKRUPTCY-PRIORITY OF UNRECORDED FEDERAL
TAX LIEN-RIGHTS OF TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
On June 3, 1960, the District Director of Internal Revenue assessed some
$14,000 in withholding taxes and interest against the Kurtz Roofing Com-
pany. Kurtz refused to pay upon demand, thereby giving rise to a federal
tax lien.' On June 20, 1960, Kurtz filed a petition in bankruptcy, but as of
this date no notice of the federal tax lien had yet been filed by the govern-
ment. The trustee in bankruptcy contended that his status was one of a
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 6321 provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax neg-
lects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount ... shall be a lien in favor
of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
belonging to such person." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 6322 provides: ". . . the lien im-
posed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made . . ." In addition to
property owned at the time of attachment, the lien also attaches to all after-acquired
property of the taxpayer while it subsists. Salsbury Motors, Inc. v. United States, 210
F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 953 (1954). However, the Collector's
rights are limited to those of the taxpayer in the property. Shaw v. United States, 331
F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1964).
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"judgment creditor" under the Bankruptcy Act,2 and as such, would pre-
vail over an unrecorded federal tax lien.3 The District Court upheld the
contention of the trustee and this decision was affirmed by the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 4 Certiorari was granted by the United States Su-
preme Court, which likewise affirmed. United States v. Speers, 86 Sup. Ct.
411 (1965).
Did Congress give the trustee in bankruptcy the rights of a judgment
creditor as that term is used in the Internal Revenue Code? This is the criti-
cal question presented in the Speers case. The Court's resolution of this
question in favor of the trustee subordinates the unrecorded federal tax
lien to a fourth-ranked unsecured priority claim in bankruptcy 5 and re-
verses a growing tide of courts of appeal cases giving the government
priority irrespective of the lack of recording.6 Certiorari was granted in
the Speers case to reconcile the conflict between these decisions and the
holding of the Sixth Circuit below.7 In the ensuing paragraphs an analysis
is presented of the reasoning behind the holdings of the courts of appeal,
2 Bankruptcy Act, § 70(c), 66 Stat 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964), providing
in part: "The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into possession or
control of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien
by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of the bankruptcy, shall be deemed
vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then hold-
ing a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually exists."
a Ir. REV. CODE OF 1954, S 6323 providing in part: "(a) . . . the lien imposed by
section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judg-
ment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the Secretary or his delegate ... "
Aside from the position of one of the protected parties under § 6323, there are generally
two other means of defeating the federal tax lien. Prior perfected liens take precedence
over the tax lien under the federal rule of first-in-time is first-in-right. United States v.
Roessling, 280 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1960). Secondly, the property is not that of the tax-
payer at all. United States v. Kings County Iron Works, 224 F.2d 232 (2nd Cir. 1955).
4 United States v. Speers, 335 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 958
(1965). The District Court opinion for the Northern District of Ohio is unreported.
5 Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(4), 52 Stat. 874 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1964).
Section 64(a) gives priority to certain unsecured claims as follows: "1) administrative
expenses, 2) wages, 3) certain creditors' expenses, 4) taxes owing by the bankrupt
to the United States or any State, 5) other enumerated debts of the bankrupt." (Em-
phasis added.) Secured creditors (the position sought by the United States in Speers)
have recourse to their security before any of the Bankruptcy Act priorities come into
play. Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement of California, 336 U.S. 118 (1949).
6 Brust v. Sturr, 237 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1956); In re Fidelity Tube Corporation, 278
F.2d 776 (3rd Cir. 1960), cert. denied sub noin., Borough of East Newark v. United
States, 364 U.S. 828 (1960); Simonson v. Granquist, 287 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1961). See
also, United States v. England, 226 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1955). Likewise, federal district
courts: In re Estrada's Market, 222 F. Supp. 253 (D.C.S.D. Cal. 1963); Matter of Green,
124 F. Supp. 481 (D.C.N.D. Ala. 1954).
7 See supra note 4. 8 Cases cited supra note 6.
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and their reversal in the instant case. Additionally, the possible impact of
the Speers holding in the bankruptcy field is explored.
In placing the unrecorded tax lien prior to the trustee's claim, the Sec-
ond, Third, and Ninth Circuits9 grounded their decisions principally on
one or more of the following three arguments: that the trustee's artificial
creditor status arising from the Bankruptcy Act did not entitle him to the
notice-filing protection afforded the judgment creditor under the Internal
Revenue Code, because the term "judgment creditor" has been construed
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Gilbert Associates'° in the con-
ventional sense to mean one holding a judgment rendered in a court of
record; secondly, that the language of the 1950 amendment to the Bank-
ruptcy Act1' is properly interpreted to exclude judgment creditor rights;12
and thirdly, that Congressional intent to give the United States Govern-
ment maximum assistance in collecting revenues was embodied in the tax
lien laws.'3 Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court
in the instant case, considered and then rejected each of these arguments.
The controlling effect of the Gilbert14 case, which was heavily relied
upon by all of the opposing courts of appeal, was done away with by a
factual distinction. Gilbert did not involve bankruptcy or the rights of a
trustee in bankruptcy, but rather a state insolvency proceeding. The town
of Walpole, New Hampshire, sought priority of its assessed ad valorem
9 Ibid.
10 345 U.S. 361 (1953), which interpreted the term "judgment creditor" under INr.
REv. CODE OF 1939, 5 3672, the predecessor of TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323. The Su-
preme Court, in the Gilbert case, cited the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson
in United States v. Security Trust and Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950) at 51 and 52,
wherein Justice Jackson reviews the history of the tax lien statute and indicates that
"only a judgment creditor in the conventional sense" is protected. The Gilbert decision
was relied upon by all of the circuits opposing the position of the instant case. See
cases cited supra note 6.
11 The 1950 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, § 70(c), 64 Stat. 26 (1950), 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(c) (1964) eliminated any reference to "judgment creditor" status for the trustee
and gave him all the "rights, remedies and powers" of a creditor holding a lien acquired
"by legal or equitable proceedings" as to all property in which the bankrupt has an in-
terest whether or not the property is in the court's possession. The amended statute,
52 Stat. 881 (1938), provided in pertinent part: "The trustee, as to all property in the
possession or under the control of the bankruptcy ... shall be deemed vested ... with
all the rights, remedies, and powers or a creditor then holding a lien thereon by legal or
equitable proceedings . . . and, as to all other property, the trustee shall be deemed
vested ... with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor then holding
an execution duly returned unsatisfied ... "
12 In re Fidelity Tube Corporation, supra note 6 at 781-82.
13 Id. at 778. Maximum assistance, as indicated by the holding of the Third Circuit
in the Fidelity Tube case, means giving the government secured creditor status in bank-
ruptcy.
14 See supra note 10.
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tax lien over the federal government's unrecorded tax lien in the proceeds
of the sale of the insolvent's assets in the hands of the state appointed re-
ceiver. Under New Hampshire law, the municipal tax assessment is "in the
nature of a judgment."' 5 The municipality, as a judgment creditor, claimed
the protection of notice-filing owed by the federal government to a judg-
ment creditor under the Internal Revenue Code.' 6 The Supreme Court re-
jected the municipality's argument, saying that although the Court could
not question New Hampshire's determination of the effect of its munici-
pal tax assessments internally, "the meaning of a federal statute is for this
Court to decide."' 7 The Court went on to say:
A cardinal principle of Congress in its tax scheme is uniformity, as far as may
be. Therefore, a "judgment creditor" should have the same application in all
states. In this instance, we think Congress used the words "judgment creditor"
in § 3672 in the usual, conventional sense of a judgment of a court of record,
since all states have such courts. We do not think Congress had in mind the
action of taxing authorities who may be acting judicially as in New Hampshire
and some other states, where the end result is something "in the nature of a
judgment," while in other states the taxing authorities act quasijudicially and
are considered administrative bodies.' 8
The Supreme Court in the Speers case pointed up the fact that the Gil-
bert interpretation of "judgment creditor" under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 was made in the light of the dominant need for uniformity
in application of the federal tax lien law to varying state-constituted cred-
itors. No such problem exists when we are concerned with the rights of a
trustee in bankruptcy, because, by definition, the problem is limited to a
construction of purely federal law.19 Congress may give the trustee any
powers it sees fit.
An analysis of Congressional intent in enacting section 70(c) of the
Bankruptcy Act and amending it in 195020 revealed a desire to implicitly
give the trustee in bankruptcy the rights, remedies, and powers of a judg-
ment creditor, such being contrary to the holding of the Third Circuit.21
15 Id. at 363.
16 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, S 3672 preceding INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323, the perti-
nent language of which is set out in supra note 3.
17 United States v. Gilbert Associates, upra note 10 at 363.
18 1d. at 364. 19 United States v. Speers, 86 Sup. Ct. 411, 414 (1965).
2OBankruptcy Act, S 70(c), 64 Stat. 26 (1950), 11 U.S.C. 5 110(c) (1964). Section
70(c) was reenacted in its present form (with slight additional amendment not affecting
the present discussion) at 66 Stat. 430 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964) ultimately
giving the trustee "all the rights, remedies, and powers" of a creditor holding a lien
on the bankrupt's property, a lien acquired "by legal or equitable proceedings." See
pertinent statutory language set out in note 2 supra.
21 See supra note 12.
472 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
The judicial narrowing of the trustee's rights after the 1950 amendment
and prior to the Spears case
seem[s] to be due not so much to positive mistakes in drafting as to an omis-
sion to spell out explicitly what might be taken to be fairly implicit in the
statute [in regard to the trustee's rights as a judgment creditor], particularly
in light of its legislative history.22
Speaking generally as to the nature of the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme
Court said that "bankruptcy has the force and effect of the levy of an exe-
cution for the benefit of [general] creditors to insure an equitable distri-
bution amongst them of the bankrupt's assets."'23 The enactment of section
47(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act,24 which preceded section 70(c), was
nothing more than a specific application of this guiding principle of equi-
table distribution. The law prior to section 47(a) (2) merely gave the trus-
tee the ownership rights of the bankrupt in the bankrupt's property,
subject to all liens, secret or otherwise, of any creditor. By making the
owner-trustee a judgment creditor as of the date of bankruptcy under
section 47 (a) (2), Congress sought to protect the general creditors (whom
the trustee represents) from the evils of secret liens that had priority un-
der former law.25 Enactment of section 70(c) in substantially the same
language continued this protection. 26
The 1950 amendment to section 70(c) deleted any reference to "judg-
ment creditor" rights that the trustee had regarding property not in the
court's possession under the 1938 version. The revised statute gives the
trustee all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a lien by
legal or equitable proceedings as to all of the bankrupt's property. As pre-
22 MacLachlan, Secured and Prior Claims in Bankruptcy, H.R. 5195 to Amend the
Bankruptcy Act, a Conmment, 13 Bus. LAW. 128, 134 (1957). Congressional concern
over the narrow meaning attached to 5 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act by the courts of
appeal brought a number of proposed amendments to reiterate the trustee's judgment
creditor rights. One such bill, H.R. 5195, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957), is set out in
MacLachlan, id at 136, n. 12. See United States v. Speers, 86 Sup. Ct. 411, 416, n. 16
(1965).
23 Myers v. Matley, 318 U.S. 622, 627 (1943).
24 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, S 47(a) (2), 36 Stat. 838, 840 § 8 providing in part:
.. and such trustees, as to all property in the custody or coming into the custody
of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and
powers of a creditor holding a lien by equitable or legal proceedings thereon; and
also, as to all property not in the custody of the bankruptcy court, shall be deemed
vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor holding an
execution duly returned unsatisfied." (Emphasis added).
25 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.47 at 1389, n. 6 (14th ed. 1959). See also, United States
v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955) (dictum).
2 6 Bankruptcy Act, 5 70(c), 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. S 110(c) (1964). See
supra note 22 where-in the statute is set out, and 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.47 at
1392 (14th ed. 1959).
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viously mentioned, the Third Circuit deemed the deleted "judgment cred-
itor" language to mean a deletion of such rights.27 Quite to the contrary,
the House report accompanying the proposed amendment indicated an in-
tent "to simplify, and to some extent expand, the general expression of the
rights of the trustee in bankruptcy, ' 2 and not to cut down his rights. It
was felt that since a judgment creditor in some states does not have a lien
on the debtor's property, the trustee would not be sufficiently protected
with only judgment creditor rights. Thus, he was given the rights of a lien
creditor which would include any lesser judgment creditor rights.29
Congressional policy to give the federal government maximum assistance
in collection of revenues as indicated by the tax lien laws is not without
limit. Prior to 1913, the federal tax lien did enjoy unmitigated priority.30
In 1913 several exceptions to this unmitigated priority were engrafted on
the tax lien due to the harsh conditions pointed up by United States v.
Snyder.8x This case held that a statutorily created federal tax lien was valid
against a bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge or notice of
such lien. The 1913 Congressional reaction to this decision gave mort-
gagees, purchasers and judgment creditors the protection of notice-filing
on the part of the government before their claims could be subordinated
to the statutory tax lien.82 Significantly, this protection came three years
after the trustee in bankruptcy was given judgment creditor rights.33 The
purpose of giving the trustee such rights was precisely to protect general
creditors of the bankrupt from the evils of secret liens, 4 which coincides
with the Congressional purpose in giving a judgment creditor protection
from the government's own secret tax lien.
In summary, the Gilbert case was held to be inapplicable, the 1950
amendment was passed to expand the rights of the trustee to further pro-
27 Supra note 12.
28 H. R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. at 7 (1949). See also, Seligson, Creditor's
Rights, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 708, 710 (1957).
29 Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952).
See 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.49 at 1415, n. 3c (14th ed. 1959).
30 Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Govermnent. The Pernicious Ca-
reer of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L. J. 905 (1954). For a discussion of
cases pointing up the need for exception of unlimited federal priority, and notes indi-
cating the history of statutorily engrafted exceptions growing out of these cases, see
id. at 919-22.
31149 U.S. 210 (1893). See Comment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1316, 1319-20 (1961).
32 Ir. REv. CODE OF 1913, S 3672, 37 Stat. 1016 (1913). See also, H. R. REP,. No. 1018,
62d Cong., 2d Sess. at 2 (1912), accompanying this enactment, in which it is stated that
a lien so comprehensive so as to cover all property anywhere imposes an impossible
task of ascertaining whether the owner of property is behind in tax payments.
88 See supra note 24. 4 See supra note 25.
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tect general creditors, and, in contemplation of the trustee's existing rights
as a judgment creditor, the various exceptions to tax lien priority were en-
acted to give protection from the secret tax lien. The inescapable conclu-
sion follows that the trustee in bankruptcy has the status of a judgment
creditor as that term is used in the Internal Revenue Code,35 and so con-
cluded the Supreme Court in United States v. Speers.86 Thus, to maintain
secured creditor status the United States will have to file its tax lien before
any petition in bankruptcy.
Two potential results seem to flow from the Speers decision. Foremost,
there is a possibility of an increased number of involuntary bankruptcy
petitions at the instance of creditors who may fare better in bankruptcy
where the government's unrecorded tax lien is subordinated.37 Addition-
ally, the government's practice of forebearance in recording tax liens and
taking consequent civil action for enforcement 8 may be reversed, which
might also tend to increase the number of bankruptcies. Both possibilities
are to the detriment of debtors who might otherwise be able, given time,
to regain financial stability.
Robert Goldman
35 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 6323. 3' ld. at 417.
30 86 Sup. Ct. 411 (1965). 8 8 Supra note 21.
BANKRUPTCY-SALE OF MORTGAGED CHATTELS AS
WILFUL AND MALICIOUS INJURY TO PROPERTY
NOT DISCHARGEABLE IN BANKRUPTCY
On April 7, 1962, defendants executed a chattel mortgage for restaurant
equipment, purchased from a dealer, to plaintiff-mortgagee bank, which
plaintiff duly recorded. Subsequently, on July 30, 1963, defendants re-
turned some of the mortgaged equipment to the original seller and re-
ceived a cash refund, without notice to or approval of the chattel mort-
gage holder. Subsequently, the defendants filed bankruptcy, both indi-
vidually and with respect to their restaurant partnership, in the United
States District Court. Plaintiff first learned of defendant's disposal of the
chattels when the receiver in bankruptcy was unable to deliver the chat-
tels to the plaintiff-mortgagee pursuant to a court order. Plaintiff then
instituted an action in the Circuit Court of Cook County against defend-
ants for conversion of chattels covered by a chattel mortgage. The trial
court rendered judgment for defendants on the grounds that defendant's
act of disposing of the chattels did not constitute a conversion within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act,' and that plaintiff's mortgage was not
1 Bankruptcy Act § 17(a) (2), 30 STAT. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1964).
